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Are the Benefits of Medicine  
Worth What We Pay for It? 
 
Is medical care worth it? Conventional wisdom says no, but my answer 
is emphatically yes. The benefits that we have received from medical 
advance are enormously greater than the costs. I suggest that public 
policy far outweighs the importance of cost containment relative to 
coverage expansion; we could in fact spend more and get a lot more for 
our health care dollars.  
In what follows, I talk about the costs and benefits of medical advance, 
focusing on two areas where I have done the most work: improvements 
in cardiovascular disease care and care for low birth weight infants. In 
each case, I present evidence that the benefits justify the costs, and 
discuss what that implies for public policy. 
I note at the outset that I shall be summarizing a large volume of 
research that I and others have done. I have compiled my views into a 
book, Your Money or Your Life, that the interested reader should 
consult (Cutler 2004). 
The Big Debate: Is Medicine Worth It? 
All told, the United States spends nearly 15 percent of GDP—one in 
seven dollars—on health care. That share is the highest in the world, 
and nearly twice what many European countries spend. We spend more 
on health care than the Chinese do on everything, including all the tea 
in China.  
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In addition to being a high amount, medical spending is increasing 
rapidly. Figure 1 shows data on per capita spending on medical care 
over time, adjusted for inflation. The earliest good data we have date 
from 1929, when medical spending was somewhere around $300 
dollars per person, in today’s dollars. Even in 1950, spending was only 
about $600 per person. Today, it is over $5,000 per person. 
Other countries spend less on medical care than the U.S. does, but 
medical spending has increased nearly as rapidly. The growth of 
medical costs in Canada is nearly equal to that in the U.S., for example, 
even though the level of spending is about 40 percent lower. 
Figure 1. Per Capita Health Care Expenditures, 1929-2002
(in 2004 dollars)
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Sources: 1929-1959: U.S.Department of Health and Human Services. 1976, Table A.2; 1960-2002: Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services. 2004, Table nhegdp02.cvs. Dollars converted to 2004 equivalent dollars 
using Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis CPI Inflation Calculator, available at 
http://minneapolisfed.org/research/ data/us/calc/.
 
Conventional Wisdom 
For some time, conventional wisdom has been that medical care 
spending is too high, and is increasing too rapidly. Most health care 
researchers share that view. Nearly a decade ago, demographer Samuel 
Preston gave a lecture at Syracuse University titled “American 
Longevity: Past, Present, and Future” (CPR Policy Brief No. 7/1996) 
that stands as a bastion in the field. Preston was reviewing the historical 
evidence on mortality reductions from 1800 until about 1950 or so. He 
discussed various explanations for why people have become healthier 
over time, concluding:  
One, probably favored by most lay people, is that the 
advances are primarily a product of Big Medicine: doctors 
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and hospitals, drugs and therapies. This explanation is 
almost certainly wrong. (2) 
Preston went on to mention the current situation, concluding that, for 
Medicare recipients at least, “...unequal access to Big Medicine has not 
been a critical factor in the health of the American population” (11). 
This conclusion is reinforced in other ways as well. The U.S. spends 
about 5 cents more out of every dollar on medical care than Canada, 
and nearly 10 cents more than the United Kingdom, and yet health 
outcomes in those countries don’t seem to be demonstrably worse 
(OECD 2003, Table 10). Other studies show the same in the United 
States: areas that spend substantially more on medical care have no 
better health outcomes than areas that spend less (Fisher et al. 2003a,b; 
Wennberg and Cooper 1999). And direct examination of the care that is 
received shows that perhaps 10 percent of the people receiving high-
tech medical interventions do not meet clinical criteria for when those 
interventions are appropriate (Rand 1998). All of that argues for a low 
value of medical care. 
When I was in Washington, D.C., working on the Clinton Health Plan, 
that was certainly the prevailing view. Indeed, the conventional wisdom 
went even further: not only was medical spending largely wasteful but 
it was damaging the economy. President Bill Clinton summarized this 
best in his address to the Joint Session of Congress in September 1993, 
when he was introducing his Health Security Act: 
...[R]ampant medical inflation is eating away at our 
wages, our savings, our investment capital, and our public 
treasury. It undermines America’s economy, competitive-
ness, confidence, and living standards....Our competitive-
ness, our whole economy, the integrity of the way the 
government works and, ultimately, our living standards 
depend upon our ability to achieve savings [in medical 
care costs] without harming the quality of health care. 
(Clinton 1993) 
In the decade since the Clinton Health Plan, conventional wisdom has 
not changed greatly. The Republicans’ plan for Medicare reform 
stresses the need to save money in the program. President Bush 
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mentions the high cost of health care frequently (often blaming it on 
malpractice and trial lawyers). The headlines that greet annual spending 
data (‘ominous trends’, ‘resurgent inflation’) suggest that most 
reporters, analysts, and members of the public agree. 
The Limitations of Conventional Wisdom 
Before presenting a different view of the situation, let me offer a few 
observations about this combined evidence. One point to note is the 
distinction between the value of some care and the value of medical 
care as a whole. Just because some of the medical care provided is not 
worth it does not mean that all of the care provided is not worth it. It 
may be, for example, that the U.S. provides a lot more unnecessary care 
than Canada, but both the U.S. and Canada provide a lot of care that is 
very valuable. The studies discussed above are not designed to analyze 
how much of care is valuable; rather they demonstrate only that some 
care is not. In thinking about the future course of medical care and what 
we can afford, the value of spending as a whole is more important than 
knowing whether there is some waste. 
In addition, a lot of the evidence about the changes in the medical 
system over time predate the growth of the modern medical system. 
Most of the demographic data on health improvement, for example, 
focus on the long time span of human health over the past few 
centuries, often up until about 1950. When we talk about the growth of 
the medical system, however, we are dealing with a relatively recent 
time historically—really the past 50 years. (see Muller, CPR Policy 
Brief 26/2003, 3-4). In 1950, medical care was still only 4 percent of 
the economy; today it’s 14 percent of the economy. So what we want to 
evaluate is the medical system of the last half century. 
That is the question I want to focus on: Has the era when big medicine 
has come to dominate the landscape of health been a good era for us or 
a bad one? What have we put into it and what have we received? The 
existing data are not up to answering this question. 
Benefits Count, Too 
After the Clinton plan was rejected (see Marilyn Moon, CPR Policy 
Brief No. 4/1995), I returned to Harvard University and asked myself 
how we really knew that we spent too much on medical care. What is 
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the evidence on which that is based? After a decade of research and 
contemplation, I’m finally willing to tell you my answer: I think the 
conventional reasoning is wrong.  
To decide whether we spend too much on medical care—or any good—
we need to weigh costs against benefits. Money that we spend on 
medicine can’t be used for other priorities, and that is a real cost to 
society. But what do we get for our money? Are the benefits large 
enough to justify the costs? 
Conceptually, there are two possible benefits of medical care that we 
need to account for:  
• People on average live longer, higher quality lives because of their 
interaction with the medical system, and this longer life has value to 
them. 
• Providing health care to people may allow them to work and earn 
more, contributing financially to others, or may lead to greater Social 
Security and other costs, taking away from the income of others. These 
financial consequences of medicine also need to be addressed.  
The personal value of better health is non-monetary, the same way that 
having cleaner parks or less dirty air or safer streets is not expressed in 
money earned. In that sense, we are tempted not to measure it. But 
ignoring it is not right; one of the things that differentiates us from our 
ancestors a century or two ago is that life is much better now than it 
was then. The major challenges we face in evaluating the costs and 
benefits of medical care are measuring changes in health and attaching 
a dollar value to the benefits. 
Trends in Health 
Health has many dimensions. Mortality is a clear one—what share of 
people are alive. Quality of life is also important, but more difficult to 
measure.  
Figure 2 shows age-adjusted mortality in the United States in the 
twentieth century. Mortality has fallen substantially in the past hundred 
years. In 1900, more than 2,500 per 100,000 people died in a typical 
year (about 2.5 per 100). Today, mortality is two-thirds lower. The 
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translation of this is substantially greater life expectancy at birth, shown 
in the bottom line in Figure 3. Life expectancy at birth has increased by 
about 30 years in the past century, and by about 10 years just in the past 
half-century.  
Figure 2. Age-Adjusted Deaths, All Causes, 1900-2002
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Source:  For 1900-1998: NCHS (2003d); for 1999-2000: NCHS (2003b); for 2001-2002, 
Kochanek and Smith 2004.
 
Figure 3. Life Expectancy at Birth, 1900-2002,
and at Age 65, 1950-2002
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Source: from birth: Arias (2002, Table 12); from age 65: NCHS (2003a, Table 27).  
Looking backward, of course, life expectancy couldn’t have been 
increasing this rapidly forever. Life expectancy at birth was estimated 
to be about 35 years in 1800, and 40,000 years before that it was 
probably about 25 years. So there’s been a substantial increase in the 
rate at which we are getting healthier over time. 
The trend of declining mortality looks pretty uniform in the twentieth 
century, but if you stare longer, it breaks apart into a few different 
pieces. There is a period of fairly steady decline from 1900 until the 
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1950s. There is then a period from the mid-1950s to the mid-1960s 
when mortality is no longer declining, after which it resumes its 
decline.  
Disaggregating by cause shows the reason for this pattern. Figure 4 
graphs mortality from pneumonia and influenza (representative of 
infectious diseases as a whole) and cardiovascular disease. The vast 
bulk of mortality reduction in the first half of the twentieth century—
indeed, for the few centuries before that—is a result of fewer people 
dying of infectious diseases. This is true in the U.S. and other countries 
as well. Nutritional advance was important in this decline (McKeown 
1976; Fogel 1994), as was ‘big’ public health (clean water, sanitation, 
and the like) and ‘little’ public health (hand washing, refrigeration, 
etc.). By the 1940s, penicillin and sulfa drugs crowned the 
achievement. Since 1950, there has been little reduction in infectious 
disease mortality; it has fallen about as low as we know how to drive it. 
Figure 4. Age-Adjusted Death Rates for Cardiovascular Diease and Influenza/Pneumonia, 
1900-2002
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Source:  For 1900-1998: NCHS (2003d); for 1999-2000: NCHS (2003b); for 2001-2002, Kochanek and 
Smith 2004.  
Through about 1960, mortality from everything else was relatively 
constant. Thus, around the mid-1950s and 1960s was an era when there 
was essentially no improvement in infectious disease mortality and no 
change in anything else either (see Figure 3 above). In 1969 biologist 
René Dubos gloomily predicted that “modern medicine has little to 
offer for the prevention or treatment of chronic and degenerative 
diseases that dominate the pathological picture of technologic 
societies” (328). Indeed, cardiovascular mortality, which was the 
leading cause of death, had been increasing over that same half-
Lourie Memorial Lecture Policy Brief 
8 
century. There was no evidence in any society of people reducing 
mortality from the chronic diseases of old age. It was the age of 
diminished expectations.  
And then, very shortly thereafter, cardiovascular disease mortality 
started declining extremely rapidly. Since then it has declined by about 
two-thirds. Reduced cardiovascular disease mortality is the largest 
contributor to improved mortality in the past half century: it contributes 
over 5 years to the 8.8 year increase in life expectancy at birth. 
Continued reductions in infant mortality are second in importance, 
accounting for over another year (Figure 5). Together, these two factors 
explain about three-quarters of the increase in life expectancy since 
1960. 
Figure 5. Infant, Neonatal, and Postneonatal Mortality,
1915-2002
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Source: For 1915-1993: NCHS (2002), Table 2-2; for 1995-2000, NCHS (2003a), Table 22; for 
2001-2002: Kochanek and Smith (2004), Table 4.  
There is an important change in infant mortality, however, that is 
central to the story. In the first half of the century, most of the 
reductions in infant mortality were in the post-neonatal period (between 
one month and one year of life). Infants in this age range generally die 
of infectious diseases. Since 1960, however, reductions in neonatal 
mortality (death in the first month of life) have been more important. 
These deaths are much more a product of medical care delivered in the 
early post-birth period. 
Figure 6 shows the transition in mortality reduction in a different way. 
The chart shows the age groups accounting for the increase in life 
expectancy over time. The height of each bar indicates how many years 
of life were added from mortality reductions at the indicated ages. 
Between 1900 and 1940, life expectancy grew by 13 years. Four years 
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of life were added because of the sharp decline in infant mortality; 
reductions in mortality among young children added another 4 years; 
and mortality reductions for young adults another 3.5 years. In all, 90 
percent of all the improvement in mortality in that four-decade span 
was because mortality fell for people below age 45.  
From 1960 up to the present, that trend has reversed. Now, nearly two-
thirds of the life expectancy improvement (4.2 out of 6.6 years) is 
coming from people at older ages living longer. Life expectancy at age 
65 has been rising recently, where historically it had not. 
Figure 6. Change in Life Expectancy, by Age Group
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Figure 7. Percentage of Elderly with Impairments in Personal (ADL)
or Living (IADL) Functions
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Quality of Life 
While I focus primarily on mortality, I would be remiss not to at least 
mention quality of life. Figure 7 shows that the share of the elderly with 
impairments in the ability to live independently has fallen by 1 to 1.5 
Lourie Memorial Lecture Policy Brief 
10 
percent annually in the past two decades (Manton and Gu 2001). 
Indeed, Dora Costa (2000), using data from the Union Army pension 
program and other sources, estimates that the historical annual rate of 
decline in chronic disability from 1910 to 1985 was about 0.6 percent 
per year. People are living healthier, even as they are living longer. 
How Important Is Medical Care? 
The central question for my analysis is: How important is medical care 
for better health? Is the improvement in health a result of medical 
intervention or other factors? I consider cardiovascular disease and 
infant mortality first, and then come to more general conclusions. 
Cardiovascular Disease: Roosevelt, Eisenhower, and Cheney 
Cardiovascular disease is a natural condition to study since it has seen 
such major mortality reductions over time. There are any number of 
explanations for lower cardiovascular disease, ranging from medical 
advances like new surgical procedures and medications, to behavioral 
changes such as reduced smoking, to public health advances such as the 
lower fat campaign. Although decomposing these various factors is 
difficult, I have done so in the context of the book that I am 
summarizing. 
My bottom line conclusion is that about two-thirds of reduced 
cardiovascular disease mortality is the result of medical interventions, 
and the remaining one-third is attributable to behavioral factors such as 
reduced smoking. Rather than going through the gory details, I’ll 
illustrate the results with a couple of case studies. 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt died of a stroke in 1945, brought on by 
hypertension, or high blood pressure. Roosevelt’s blood pressure was 
far above anything you would see in the population today: a typical 
recording was perhaps 180/90 (Ferrell 1998, 45). Most people who 
have high blood pressure are asymptomatic and do not experience any 
impairment in their daily functioning. In Franklin Roosevelt’s case, 
however, hypertension had a substantial impact on his daily 
functioning. He couldn’t concentrate for long periods of time. In the 
last year of his life—mind you, he was fighting World War II and 
negotiating with Stalin at Yalta—he took off every Thursday, came into 
the office late in the morning, and left early in the afternoon. He took a 
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five-week vacation to Hawaii to talk with the Commander of the 
Pacific fleet, a conversation which lasted one hour. When Winston 
Churchill’s doctor saw Roosevelt at Yalta he remarked, “I doubt, from 
what I have seen, whether he is fit for his job here” (Moran 1966, 
223). 
If you wonder why Roosevelt wasn’t treated, the answer is that there 
were no good treatment options. The leading possibilities were 
sympathectomy, a dangerous surgery to cut the nerves to the arteries, 
and drugs that are very incapacitating. Today, we could control 
Roosevelt’s hypertension for a few dollars a day and pretty much 
prevent his stroke. Lack of care was cheap, but it was also deadly. 
Dwight David Eisenhower was President shortly after Roosevelt, from 
1952 to 1960. In 1955 Dwight Eisenhower had a heart attack. Standard 
medical therapy at the time, if you look in the textbooks, was to keep 
the patient in bed, literally in bed, for six weeks, and then to gingerly 
transport the patient home, where he would remain in bed for six 
months. The theory at the time was that the heart attack didn’t kill 
people; what killed them was the strain on the heart afterwards. So 
Eisenhower was kept in bed for six weeks. Of course, that therapy is 
not only ineffective, but it actually harms the patient.  
In Eisenhower’s day, it was also expected that a person who had a heart 
attack would never really resume a regular life, although that wasn’t the 
case with Eisenhower, who actually ran for and won re-election after 
his heart attack. A very rare person in his time, he was able to survive 
and lead a good quality life (Lasby 1997). 
Nowadays we would treat Eisenhower very differently. If you want to 
know how we would treat him, just ask Dick Cheney, because the 
current Vice President has had everything that you could have—some 
multiple times. To start, a person with a heart attack would get drugs 
that work to dissolve the clot blocking the coronary arteries. In 
addition, he would likely get a surgical technique to figure out the 
extent of the blockage, and maybe he’d have a balloon inserted and 
inflated to expand the blocked artery, with a wire mesh tube 
permanently installed to keep it open. Or he might have bypass surgery, 
with a major opening of the chest and a new blood flow created around 
the blockage.  
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All of that technology has had a substantial impact on survival after a 
heart attack. Mortality in the the first three months after a heart attack, 
for example, has fallen by about 75 percent. That explains about a third 
of the overall mortality decline. Another third is a result of preventive 
medications that were not available to Roosevelt: anti-hypertensive and 
cholesterol-lowering pharmaceuticals. The remaining third is a result of 
behavioral and other interventions, including reduced smoking and 
dietary changes. 
All of that technological advance was very expensive. The average 45-
year-old will spend $30,000 in present value on cardiovascular disease 
over the course of his or her remaining life. That figure includes many 
who spend nothing, averaged in with some who spend hundreds of 
thousands of dollars. But, based on the calculations described above, 
the average 45-year-old will live another 3 years because of the medical 
advance. So, here is the question in a nutshell: Is 3 additional years of 
life worth $30,000? 
What Is a Life Worth? 
Economists have a not-very-distinguished history of determining the 
value of a life. They have tended to look at what a person will earn over 
their lifetime and attribute that value to the life itself. The first person 
to do this seems to have been Sir William Petty, an English economist 
who suggested in 1690 that the mass of mankind was worth 20 years 
purchase—that is, people are worth roughly what they’ll earn over 20 
years. The amount Petty came up with, in today’s dollars, is about 
$150. Courts today use a similar approach; in litigation, the value of 
health is determined by how much a person would have earned over 
their remaining lifetime. 
Of course this is wrong, because what we care about most is not simply 
what we will earn. We want to enjoy life, and earnings are but a way to 
do that. The real question is how much people value the intrinsic 
quality of being alive.  
Economists have estimated this value in a number of ways. Typically, 
they look to see how much people are willing to pay to avoid being in 
risky situations and use that to impute the value of a life. For example, 
are you willing to pay $300 for an airbag in a car? Most people are. It 
turns out that an air bag will save the life of about 1 driver in 10,000, 
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which means that people willing to pay this amount are valuing life at 
about $3 million per person. Think about that value as a conditional 
statement: How much are you willing to pay now so that in the event of 
an auto accident you’ll be saved? That’s not so different from medical 
care, where we want to decide whether we should pay more for 
insurance now so that it covers a valuable procedure we may need at 
some time in the future. 
For a typical middle-aged person, valuing life at $3 million translates 
into about $75,000 to $100,000 per year of additional longevity. That’s 
the kind of number that gets used in the cost-effectiveness or quality 
assessment literature. A general range is about $75,000 to $150,000 per 
year. In my analysis I assume a value of $100,000 per year. 
Back to Cardiovascular Disease 
With an approximate value of a life, we can estimate the benefits of 
medical advance for cardiovascular disease. Valuing the additional 
years at $100,000 per year and discounting to age 45 yields a benefit of 
medical advance of $120,000 per person in total.  
Comparing this to the cost, the increase in medical spending on 
cardiovascular disease care seems well worth it. We spent $30,000 per 
person and received $120,000 in benefits per person. The rate of return 
is 4 to 1, or 300 percent. That is a phenomenal advance by any metric. 
To put it in perspective, a typical investment businesses consider might 
yield a return of 10 to 20 percent. We should be delighted by what we 
have been able to do. 
Low Birth Weight Infants 
I have undertaken a similar analysis for low birth weight infants. Again, 
the book I have written gives the details, so let me stick with the 
summary.  
Once again, the costs of medical advance have been high. In 1950, little 
could be done for low birth weight infants. The first incubators had 
already been developed, but they were not well suited to very 
premature infants. Furthermore, there was little doctors could do to 
promote respiratory development, the leading cause of death among 
premature infants. When little can be done, little is spent. The average 
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low birth weight infant used very little on medical care over what a 
normal birth weight infant would have spent.  
Today, the same infant would use about $70,000 of medical care over 
their remaining life beyond what a normal birth weight infant would 
use. Medical advance explains the increase. Low birth weight infants 
are whisked into very intensive (and expensive) neonatal care units, 
given artificial surfactant and other drugs to speed respiratory 
development, placed in specialized ventilators, and treated with 
countless other innovations.  
The result, not surprisingly, has been a dramatic increase in survival. 
Mortality for low birth weight infants has fallen by three-quarters since 
1950, from 5 deaths in 20 to 1 death in 20. The quality of those years is 
not perfect—some infants have severe developmental problems—but 
many are fine. Indeed, many infants who had problems in 1950 are 
normal, healthy children today, since the same innovations that 
improve survival at higher birth weights also prevent complications.  
Once again, we can value this improvement in health quantitatively. 
Using the $100,000 value of a year of life leads to a benefit of medical 
advance of $350,000 per low birth weight infant. That is 5 times the 
increase in spending, or a 400 percent rate of return. As with 
cardiovascular disease, we spend much more caring for low birth 
weight infants than we used to, but it is worth it. 
Adding It All Up 
For both cardiovascular disease and low birth weight infants, technical 
advance has increased the amount that we spend on medical care. But 
in each case, the benefits of that advance have far exceeded the costs. 
We spend more, but we get even more in return. 
How general is this statement? Is it true of the medical system as a 
whole? Without more analysis, I cannot answer that question yet. I did 
not choose cardiovascular disease and low birth weight infant care 
randomly; each is an area where mortality has fallen substantially. 
Thus, it is natural to suspect that the value of medical advance is 
particularly high for these cases. 
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While I cannot draw firm conclusions about the medical system as a 
whole, however, there is a strong conclusion I can make. The benefits 
that come solely from lower mortality for people with cardiovascular 
disease and for low birth weight infants—from these two conditions 
alone—have added over 3 years to life expectancy at birth. Valuing the 
additional years using the methodology above yields a present value of 
medical improvement of $50,000 per person. 
Now consider the entire increase in medical spending over time—for 
low birth weight infants, people with cardiovascular disease, and 
everything in between. The average person can expect to spend 
$50,000 more on medical care today than a similar person would have 
spent in 1950. In other words, the benefits of medical advance for these 
two conditions alone are equal to the entire increase in medical costs in 
the past half century. 
If the rest of medical care has any value at all—and it surely does—the 
increase in the scale of the medical system must be worth it. That is my 
primary conclusion: We spend more on medical care than we used to, 
but what we get is greater still. 
Why We Value Health So Highly 
Here’s the way I make sense of it all. We are a fairly rich society. We 
can generally afford enough food, clothing, and shelter for all of us. 
What else do we want? What we want, when we’re this wealthy, is to 
enjoy life more. One of the ways we do this is by living longer and 
higher quality lives. That’s why the value of health is so high. And 
that’s why spending more on medical care is worth it, even if the 
amount we spend is great.  
I think that’s why the “R” word is so hard to mention. You know, that 
nine-letter R word, rationing. Why are people more averse to rationing 
medical care than, say, rationing access to new clothes or new cars? 
Because the value of medical care is perceived to be so high. And it’s 
that intrinsic value that’s showing up here, that says “Even if we’re 
spending $50,000 more per person, it still may be a good deal.” Just 
because we’re spending a lot doesn’t mean that what we’re spending is 
excessive.  
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Put another way, even if there is waste and we could do better than we 
have, what we do is actually quite valuable. We have developed a 
modern ‘medical industrial complex’ that is incredibly expensive, but 
also extremely productive.  
Can This Continue? 
Will this trend continue? Can we possibly let the medical system go on 
as it has? Many handwringers suggest that we cannot. I disagree. There 
are two parts to my thinking. 
The first question is whether there will be continue to be valuable 
things to buy. That is, could we spend more in the future and continue 
to improve our health? I am neither a futurologist nor a geneticist. But 
it seems pretty clear that fundamental medical advance will enable us to 
continue to improve our lives, if we are willing to pay for it. The 
revolution in understanding the genome and genetic therapy promises 
to bring important new imaging devices, new types of medications, and 
new forms of treatment entirely. Cancer is a disease that we have yet to 
conquer, but it seems very amenable to genetic therapy. The same is 
true for countless other diseases, from Alzheimer’s to diabetes. 
Economists always worry that we have plucked the low-hanging fruit; 
perhaps we have developed all the really valuable medical advances 
already, and there is little left that will extend life greatly. I don’t think 
this model is correct. Even if the low-hanging fruit has been found, 
biomedical advance is building us ladders that will enable us to reach 
the sweet fruit at the very top of the tree.  
The second question is: Can we afford to spend more in the future than 
we do now? Once again, I think we can. Economists’ favorite food is 
the pie. We talk about medical care being 14 percent of the economic 
pie. If we double the medical care part of the pie—all of a sudden, 
medical care goes from being 1 slice out of 7 to 2 slices out of 7—we 
have to cut back on other goods and services by a significant amount. 
That’s pretty scary. 
But the pie is not the right analogy. It is wrong because we’re getting 
richer over time; in essence, the pie is growing bigger. In that sense, 
one would do better to imagine the economy as a chocolate chip 
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cookie. As it bakes, it expands. Now imagine that the cookie is getting 
bigger. We take a bigger slice for medical care, but the rest of the 
cookie could still be growing, if the whole cookie is getting bigger at a 
fast enough rate.  
That is what current forecasts suggest. I won’t go through it in great 
detail, but Figure 8 gives a hint. The most common assumption analysts 
make is that medical care costs will increase 1 percent per year more 
rapidly than will the overall economy. Under this scenario, the amount 
of money available for non-medical consumption will continue to 
increase, albeit at a lower rate than if medical care did not expand. If 
these forecasts are correct, we will continue to have more of non-
medical stuff, just not as rapid an increase in it.  
Figure 8. Effect of Projected Medical Spending Increases Relative to GDP on 
Non-Medical Consumption
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So that’s what the tradeoff will involve, for at least most of the next 50 
to 75 years: more medical care, and less rapid increases in other 
consumption, but not an absolute decline. Everyone has their own 
definition of affordability, but to me this seems very much affordable. 
Why the Worry? 
If this is the situation we face, why does it provoke such concern? Why 
are increases in computer spending seen as good, but increases in 
medical spending regarded with such gloom? To a great extent, I think 
the concern about health costs is a result of displaced anxiety. We 
Lourie Memorial Lecture Policy Brief 
18 
worry about medical costs because of the adverse—but avoidable—
consequences they bring.  
To afford increased medical spending over time, government revenue 
will have to increase. If government revenue is kept constant, increases 
in public medical costs will crowd out other valuable services—
education, public parks, and the like. This would certainly be a bad 
idea.  
We have a natural tendency to resist increases in government spending. 
But it has always struck me as silly that if the economy expands—if the 
cookie is increasing in size—the sliver that we give to the government 
should necessarily stay the same. Like it or not, government spending 
has increased enormously in the past century. In 1900, government 
spending was 5 percent of the economy. Today, it is one-third. The 
increase is a result of our growing demand for government, a 
government that insures full employment, fights wars, provides for the 
elderly and people with low income, and pays for medical care. If we 
want that latter commitment to expand, we will have to make the 
resources available. 
Concern about the poor is a second, related concern. While overall 
incomes are increasing, incomes of the poor are not. Rising health costs 
are thus a particular burden for people at the lower end of the income 
distribution. If we want to have medical spending increase and not have 
society divided even further into the haves and the have nots, we’re 
clearly going to have to redistribute more from the wealthy to the less 
wealthy. This is related to the previous concern: the job of 
redistribution inherently falls to the government. We have to allow for 
this as well.  
Finally, there are those who oppose medical spending increases 
because of concern that the increase in spending is not valuable. To be 
sure, there is a lot of waste in medical care, but there is great value as 
well. My analysis shows that, as a whole, the value far outweighs the 
waste.  
Of course, that does not mean we should ignore the waste. Any time we 
spend more money on something than is needed, that is bad. But we 
should not lose sight of the fact that our primary goal—to improve 
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health when it is justified economically—is being met in the current 
medical system. 
Summary and Conclusion 
Over time, we have witnessed the medicalization of health. Medical 
care has replaced public health and nutritional advance as the major 
contributors to health improvement. This involves much more spending 
on medicine than used to be the case, but also significant benefits. We 
are rich enough to afford our desire for better health, and satisfied 
enough with other services to want to spend our money on medicine. 
The tendency to misjudge medical spending is why health care reform 
so frequently fails. A central tenet of virtually all health reforms is that 
we cannot afford what we are paying now—that we have to cut back. 
When you couple that with wanting to insure everybody, health reform 
becomes a plan to cut back on care to middle and higher income 
people, and to transfer the resources to lower income people. 
Americans don’t like redistribution much, especially when it means 
giving up something they value dearly. When I was in Washington a 
friend of mine said that there were two possible headlines, one good 
and the other bad. The good headline was “Poor to Get Same Health 
Care as Rich.” The bad headline was “Rich to Get Same Health Care as 
Poor.” Any time you suggest something like the second headline, 
people are going to back away.  
To make progress, we have to turn the conversation away from saving 
money and cutting back, and toward increasing the value of care. How 
can we provide more of the services that are valuable and avoid 
services that are less valuable? How can we cut fat and build muscle? 
Eliminating care of low value saves money, but adding care of high 
value costs more. A health system truly focused on value could spend 
more than the current one. But there is nothing wrong with that. 
Lourie Memorial Lecture Policy Brief 
20 
For More Information 
Arias, Elizabeth. 2002. “United States Life Tables, 2000.” National 
Vital Statistics Reports 51 (3) (December 19) http://www. 
cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr51/nvsr51_03.pdf. 
Blendon, Robert J., Cathy Schoen, Catherine DesRoches, Robin 
Osborn, and Kinga Zapert. 2003. “Common Concerns Amid 
Diverse Systems: Health Care Experiences In Five Countries.” 
Health Affairs 22 (3) (May-June): 106-121. 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. 2004. “Table 
nhegdp02.cvs. Historical National Health Expenditures 
Aggregate, per Capita, Percent Distribution, and Annual 
Percent Change by Source of Funds: Calendar Years 1960-
2002.” Baltimore, MD: CMS. http://www.cms.hhs.gov/ 
statistics/nhe/. 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. 2004. “National Health 
Care Expenditures, 2002.” Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services. http://www.hcfa.gov/stats/nhe-oact/. 
Clinton, William Jefferson. 1993. “Address of the President to the Joint 
Session of Congress: Health Security for All Americans.” 
Washington, DC: White House, Office of the Press Secretary. 
September 22. http://www.ibiblio.org/ nhs/supporting/remarks-
final.html. 
Cutler, David M., and Elizabeth Richardson. 1997. “Measuring the 
Health of the U.S. Population.” Brookings Papers on Economic 
Activity. Microeconomics 1997: 217-282. 
Cutler, David M., and Mark McClellan. 2001. “Is Technological 
Change in Medical Care Worth It?” Health Affairs, 20(5), 
September/October, 11-29 
Cutler, David M., Mark McClellan, Joseph P. Newhouse, and Dahlia 
Remler. 1998. “Are Medical Prices Declining? Evidence from 
Heart Attack Treatments.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 
113 (4) (November): 991-1024. 
David M. Cutler 
21 
Cutler, David M., and Elizabeth Richardson. 1999. “Your Money and 
Your Life: The Value of Health and What Affects It.” In 
Frontiers in Health Policy Research, edited by Alan M. 
Garber. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 99-132. 
Cutler, David M. 2004. Your Money or Your Life: Strong Medicine for 
America’s Health Care System. Oxford, UK, and New York: 
Oxford University Press.  
Dartmouth Atlas Project. 2004. “The Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care 
Web Site.” http://www.dartmouthatlas.org. 
Dubos, René J. 1969. “The Diseases of Civilization.” Milbank 
Memorial Fund Quarterly 47: 327-339. 
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. 2004. “What Is a Dollar Worth? 
CPI Inflation Calculator.” Federal Reserve Bank of 
Minneapolis. http://minneapolisfed.org/research/data/us/calc/. 
Ferrell, Robert H. 1998. The Dying President: Franklin D. Roosevelt, 
1944-1945. Columbia, Missouri: University of Missouri Press.  
Fisher, Elliott S., David E. Wennberg, Thérèse A. Stukel, Daniel J. 
Gottlieb, F. L. Lucas, and Étoile Pinder. 2003a. “The 
Implications of Regional Variations in Medicare Spending. 
Part 1: The Content, Quality, and Accessibility of Care.” 
Annals of Internal Medicine 138 (4) (February 18): 273-287. 
http://www.annals.org/cgi/reprint/ 138/4/273.pdf. 
Fisher, Elliott S., David E. Wennberg, Thérèse A. Stukel, Daniel J. 
Gottlieb, F. L. Lucas, and Étoile Pinder. 2003b. “The 
Implications of Regional Variations in Medicare Spending. 
Part 2: Health Outcomes and Satisfaction with Care.” Annals of 
Internal Medicine 138 (4) (February 18): 288-298. 
http://www.annals.org/cgi/reprint/138/4/288.pdf. 
Fogel, Robert W. 1994. “Economic Growth, Population Theory, and 
Physiology: The Bearing of Long-Term Processes on the 
Making of Economic Policy.” American Economic Review 84 
(3) (June): 369-395. 
Kochanek, Kenneth D., and Betty L. Smith. 2004. “Deaths: Preliminary 
Data for 2002.” National Vital Statistics Reports 52 (13) 
Lourie Memorial Lecture Policy Brief 
22 
(February 11). http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr52/ 
nvsr52_13.pdf. 
Lasby, Clarence G. 1997. Eisenhower’s Heart Attack: How Ike Beat 
Heart Disease and Held On to the Presidency. Lawrence, 
Kansas: University Press of Kansas.  
Manton, Kenneth G., and Xi Liang Gu. 2001. “Changes in the 
Prevalence of Chronic Disability in the United States Black and 
Nonblack Population Above Age 65 from 1982 to 1999.” 
Proceedings of the National Academies of Science: Social 
Sciences 98 (11) (May 22): 6354-6359. http://www.pnas.org/ 
cgi/reprint/98/11/6354.pdf. 
McKeown, Thomas. 1976. The Modern Rise of Population. New York: 
Academic Press.  
Moon, Marilyn. 1995. “The Rhetoric and the Reality of Health Care 
Reform Legislation.” CPR Policy Brief No. 4. Sixth Annual 
Herbert Lourie Memorial Lecture on Health Care Policy. 
Syracuse, NY: Center for Policy Research, Syracuse 
University. http://www-cpr.maxwell.syr.edu/pbriefs/ 
pbriefs/pb4.pdf. 
Moran, Charles McMoran Wilson. 1966. Winston Churchill: The 
Struggle for Survival, 1940-1965. London: Constable. 
Muller, Ralph W. 2003. “The Changing American Hospital in the 
Twenty-first Century.” CPR Policy Brief No. 26. Syracuse, 
NY: Center for Policy Research, Syracuse University. April. 
http://www-cpr.maxwell.syr.edu/pbriefs/pb26.pdf. 
National Center for Health Statistics. 2002. Vital Statistics of the 
United States 1993. DHHS Publication No. (PHS) 2002-1101. 
II - Mortality, Part A. Hyattsville, MD: National Center for 
Health Statistics. http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/vsus/ 
mort93_2a.pdf. 
National Center for Health Statistics. 2003a. Health, United States, 
2003. Hyattsville, MD: NCHS. http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/ 
products/pubs/pubd/hus/03hustop.htm. 
David M. Cutler 
23 
National Center for Health Statistics. 2003b. “GMWK293 Age-
Adjusted Death Rates for 113 Selected Causes, United States, 
1999-2000.” NCHS. Page reviewed on April 16, 2003. 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/datawh/statab/unpubd/mortabs/gmwk
293_10.htm. 
National Center for Health Statistics. 2003c. “Unpublished Historical 
Data: Death Rates, Age-Specific Death Rates, Age-Adjusted 
Death Rates, Life Expectancy, Leading Causes of Death.” 
National Center for Health Statistics. Page reviewed on August 
15, 2003. http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/datawh/statab/ 
unpubd/mortabs/hist-tabs.htm. 
National Center for Health Statistics. 2003d. “HIST293 Age-Adjusted 
Death Rates for Selected Causes, Death Registration States, 
1900-32, and United States, 1933-98.” NCHS. Page reviewed 
on April 16, 2003. http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/datawh/statab/ 
unpubd/ mortabs/hist293.htm. 
Newhouse, Joseph P. 1992. “Medical Care Costs: How Much Welfare 
Loss?” Journal of Economic Perspectives 6 (3) (Summer): 3-
21. 
Nordhaus, William D. 2003. “The Health of Nations: The Contribution 
of Improved Health to Living Standards.” Chapter 2 in 
Measuring the Gains from Medical Research: An Economic 
Approach, edited by Kevin M. Topel Robert H. Murphy. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. 2003. 
OECD Health Data 2003. Paris: OECD. Table 10. 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/1/31/2957323.xls. 
Petty, Sir William. 1690. Political Arithmetick. Third edition. Prepared 
as an e-text by Rod Hay and posted at the Archive for the 
History of Economic Thought, McMaster University, Canada, 
April 1, 1998. http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/ 
economics/petty/index.htm#index. 
Preston, Samuel H. 1996. “American Longevity: Past, Present, and 
Future.” Center for Policy Research, Policy Brief No. 7/1996. 
Lourie Memorial Lecture Policy Brief 
24 
Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University. http://www-cpr.maxwell. 
syr.edu/pbriefs/pb7.pdf. 
RAND Corporation. 1998. “Assessing the Appropriateness of Care: 
How Much Is Too Much?” Research Brief 4522. Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND Health. http://www.rand.org/ 
publications/RB/RB4522/. 
Skinner, Jonathan, Elliott Fisher, and John E. Wennberg. 2001. “The 
Efficiency of Medicare.” NBER Working Paper No. 8395. 
Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research. July. 
Tolley, George S., Donald S. Kenkel, and Robert G. Fabian (editors). 
1994. Valuing Health for Policy: An Economic Approach. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
U.S. Census Bureau. 1976. The Statistical History of the United States 
from Colonial Times to the Present [1970]. With an 
Introduction and User’s Guide by Ben J. Wattenberg. New 
York: Basic Books.  
U.S. Census Bureau. 2004. 2003 Statistical Abstract of the United 
States. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office. 
http://www.census.gov/prod/www/statistical-abstract-03.html. 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services [formerly DHEW]. 
1976. Health United States, 1975. DHEW Publication No. 
(HRA) 76-1232. Washington, DC: Government Printing 
Office. http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hus/hus75acc.pdf. 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention, National Center for Health Statistics. 
2004. Health, United States, 2003. http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/ 
hus.htm. 
Viscusi, W. Kip, “The Value of Risks to Life and Health”, 1993, 
Journal of Economic Literature, 31, December, 1912-1946. 
Wennberg, John E., and Megan McAndrew Cooper (editors). 1999. The 
Quality of Medical Care in the United States: A Report on the 
Medicare Program. The Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care 1999. 
Hanover, NH: Dartmouth Medical School and American 
David M. Cutler 
25 
Hospital Association. http://www.dartmouthatlas.org/ 
default.php. 
Wennberg, John E., Elliott S. Fisher, and Jonathan S. Skinner. 2002. 
“Geography and the Debate over Medicare Reform.” Health 
Affairs (February 13): W96-W114. 
